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THE COMMENTING POWER:
AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
DONALD J. KOCHAN*
I. Introduction
Whether you are a member of the resistance movement or a cheerleader
for the new Trump administration’s regulatory reform agenda, this Article
intends to engage your passion. (Of course, scholars, students, and agency
officials should be interested too.) The notice and comment rulemaking
process governing the creation of most regulations generated by federal
agencies includes an obligation that agencies respond to public comments.
This public participation requirement, with its “two-way street” obligation
to dialogue, is a critical check on agency power. Anyone interested in
regulation and governance, including scholars, lawyers, and the public at
large, should better understand the contours of this area of law.
This Article provides a critical tutorial for anyone interested in getting
involved in regulatory change, whether for or against. Further, it helps one
understand why what this Article dubs the “commenting power” is so
critical in our democratic republic—it allows ordinary citizens, as much as
sophisticated interest groups, opportunities to participate in and have
opinions heard on the development of regulations.
Noted administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis has described the
“notice and comment” rulemaking process as “one of the greatest
inventions of modern government.”1 This status is due in no small part to
the ability of notice and comment rulemaking to engage the public in the
process in a meaningful way. The commenting power given to ordinary
individuals is rather extraordinary.
When an agency proposes a rule, individuals get a chance to comment,
and an agency must respond to significant comments raised during the
rulemaking before the rule can become final and effective. This
commenting power—vested by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2
in the people, who might be called the “roots” feeding the branches of
government—acts as a brilliantly crafted check and balance on
* Parker S. Kennedy Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Research & Faculty
Development, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. Special thanks to
Jennifer Spinella for comments and suggestions.
1. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969).
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).
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governmental regulation in the spirit of other checks and balances like
bicameralism and presentment, an independent judiciary, and other aspects
of the separation of powers. The commenting power ensures that the ballot
box is not the only place where citizens get to serve a checking function on
government; they have it also in their ability to participate in agency
rulemaking. Professor and former United States Deputy Chief Technology
Officer Beth Simone Noveck summarized it well when she explained,
“Participation in rulemaking is one of the most fundamental, important, and
far-reaching of democratic rights.”3 Rather than lying in another branch of
government, as do most of what we consider checks and balances, the
commenting power rests in the people.
The check provided by the commenting power can be particularly
important when administrative agencies are faced with new leadership and,
as a result, new work. This work ranges from the usual, expected changes in
regulatory policy that follow almost any change in administration to more
dramatic changes or even what some consider regulatory upheaval—for
good or bad. As these changes occur, there is a critical role for public
participation that sometimes evades the attention of pundits, talking heads,
news anchors, editorial writers, and the general public.
To facilitate the commenting power, key provisions of the APA (and
many state equivalents) foster meaningful public participation in the
formation and adjustment of regulatory rules. As will be described here,
agencies usually must post a proposal for public review, upon which the
public is given a window to submit comments. These comments can say
just about anything and can support, oppose, or simply suggest ways to
improve the proposal. And here’s the kicker: the agency is required to
review and consider those comments submitted to it, regardless of who
from and regardless of form. Furthermore, the agency needs to “respond” to
significant comments by addressing concerns raised in comments when
announcing (and then “promulgating” and making effective) its final rule.
That makes the ability to comment meaningful and capable of making a
difference. It means that comments can be powerful.
An agency does not need to agree with a commenter and is not required
to make the changes requested, but, for substantial comments (which this
Article will define), the agency will be disciplined if such comments are
ignored. The purpose of the commenting period and the requirement of
consideration of and response to comments is to make sure the public
3. Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J.
433, 517 (2004).
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participation is meaningful and to require the agency to think through its
proposed actions. By forcing agencies to think things through, the
commenting process serves to discipline the agency and to act as a quality
control mechanism.4 When an agency does not take comments seriously, it
is acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and the rules it produces in
such a process can be invalidated because they do not reflect reasoned
deliberation.5
It is shocking that so many people who hold the commenting power—
that’s all of us—never choose to exercise it. This Article is designed to
educate individuals on that power in the hopes of inspiring more of the
public to become engaged by explaining the process of commenting
generally, the development of the law regarding an agency’s legal
responsibilities to respond to comments, and the power of comments as an
accountability mechanism. To that end, Part II of this Article briefly
summarizes the notice and comment rulemaking process. Part III examines
rulemaking in a time of transition between administrations, along with
some general comments on the reasons to comment. Part IV focuses on
some of the mechanics of commenting. Several cases on an agency’s duty
to respond to comments will be analyzed in Part V, and the Article will
close in Part VI by analyzing the lessons on an agency’s duty to respond to
comments provided in Sierra Club v. EPA6 and Waterkeeper Alliance v.
EPA,7 both decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. These cases are excellent examples of the power of
commenting and of the judiciary’s willingness to scrutinize the sufficiency
of an agency’s consideration of comments. The Waterkeeper Alliance case,
in particular, illustrates two realities: (1) it will serve as an example where
an agency changed its position in a final rule after receiving comments on
its proposal, that is, where commenting worked; and (2) it will serve as
evidence of courts holding agencies accountable when an agency fails to
respond to comments it receives, ultimately invalidating the agency action
because it did not take a commenter seriously enough.

4. Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 158
(2012) (discussing how notice and comment rulemaking—along with the concomitant duty
to respond—“increases the accuracy of agency decision-making”).
5. Id. at 155-56 (explaining why the “response” obligation for agencies is a necessary
requirement to effectuate judicial review for arbitrary and capricious behavior).
6. 863 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
7. 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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II. What Is Notice and Comment (or “Informal”) Rulemaking?
Federal administrative agencies generate regulatory policy in many
ways, but “notice and comment” rulemaking (also known as “informal”
rulemaking)8 is the most powerful piston driving the regulatory engine.
Notice and comment rulemaking is governed by a set of procedures
established by the Administrative Procedure Act; this Part provides a brief
overview of those procedures.
“Rulemaking” is defined in the APA as the process of “formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule.”9 A “rule” is defined broadly to include
“statement[s] of general or particular applicability and future effect” that
are designed to “implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”10 Even
though rulemaking is a regulatory action, the rules generated after notice
and comment rulemaking are typically described as “legislative rules,”
given that they become binding with the “force and effect of law.” 11 That
label also functions as a means of distinguishing them from other rules with
less force that may emerge through other regulatory processes. Note that
there are things agencies can do that do not require officially receiving and
responding to comments, including developing guidance, making interim
rules, and making emergency rules, among others. These actions, however,
are either exceptions, rather than the rule, or are given less binding legal
effect than legislative rules generated through notice and comment
processes.
The notice and comment rulemaking process starts with a proposed rule
being made available to the public—the “general notice of proposed
rulemaking”—to alert members of the general public of an expected
regulatory action and to invite their input, usually by publication in the
Federal Register.12 Subsequently, members of the public are given a
window in which they are allowed to participate in the formation of the
8. “Notice and comment rulemaking” is also known as “informal rulemaking,” which
is a misnomer because it involves a fair amount of formal procedures (including publishing
and noticing the existence of proposed rules, providing a comment period, etc.). The
“informal” moniker is actually an unfortunate one resulting from historical legislative
drafting issues involved in the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012).
10. Id. § 551(4).
11. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Consequently, the notice required by the APA, or information
subsequently supplied to the public, must disclose in detail the thinking that has animated
the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is based.”).
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final rule—the “comment period.” During this period, anyone may make
suggestions to the agency regarding the proposal pursuant to the APA
requirement that when “notice [is] required” the agency must “give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments.”13 Notice is designed to
facilitate useful comments and to invite suggestions for alternative
approaches.14
At the conclusion of the comment period, the agency must consider and
respond to the comments,15 a task usually undertaken as part of an agency
decision on a final course of regulatory action or inaction—with a “final
rule” published if the agency decides its proposed rule or some logical
outgrowth of it should be promulgated and made effective and
enforceable.16 The APA requires that the promulgation of a final rule not
only include publication of the text of the rule in the Federal Register as it
will later appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) but also that it
be accompanied by “a concise general statement of [its] basis and
purpose.”17 It is within that statement of basis and purpose—often included
in what is commonly referred to the “preamble,” an explanatory writing
preceding the technical rule—where the agency will generally satisfy its
duty to respond to comments by explaining the manner in which those
comments were considered in reaching the final regulatory result. Courts
will review final rules and their preamble to evaluate whether the public’s
comments were taken seriously, as required by law.18

13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
14. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 35-36 (“[A]n agency proposing informal
rulemaking has an obligation to make its views known to the public in a concrete and
focused form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible.”).
15. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971),
abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1997); Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401,
408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d
755, 769 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[D]uring notice and comment proceedings, the agency is
obligated to identify and respond to relevant, significant issues raised during those
proceedings.” (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 885-86 (4th Cir.
1983)).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
17. Id.
18. William L. Andreen, An Introduction to Federal Administrative Law Part 1: The
Exercise of Administrative Power and Judicial Review, 50 ALA. LAW. 322, 324 (1989)
(explaining the agency’s responsibility to respond to comments in the preamble of a final
rule as designed so that “the courts can determine whether an agency is truly considering the
comments made by the public”).
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Notice and comment rulemaking evokes the spirit of democracy and
civic republicanism,19 acting as a mechanism for adding legitimacy to
governmental regulation due to the transparency of the agency action and
the involvement of the public as a check before a rule may be
promulgated.20 This ability for regular people, along with concentrated
interest groups, to influence agency decision making is sometimes
underappreciated. The public as a whole seems less familiar with notice and
comment rulemaking than they should be. In fact, law students are
surprisingly uninformed too, at least until they take a course on regulations,
like administrative law. For example, I asked my students in my Spring
2017 administrative law class to respond to two questions halfway through
the semester:
1. Most Interesting? What has been the most interesting thing
you have learned about administrative law that you did not
know before taking this class (or at least that you hadn’t
appreciated to the same extent prior to this class)? What is it
that makes that thing interesting?
2. Most Unique? What doctrine, theory, or system that you’ve
learned is unique to administrative law as compared to things
you have learned in other subject matter courses? If it is the
same as your answer to #1 above, then please focus just on
why you believe this thing is “unique” to administrative law.
Almost all of the students spent a substantial amount of time admiring the
commenting process. Here is a representative sampling that shows just how
special notice and comment seemed to my students:
$

“It’s really unique that any person can comment on a proposed
rule. In some ways it seems very American to let anyone—
regardless of station, power, or influence—to be able to have an
opinion and share it with the agency.”21

19. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514-15 (1992) (describing the democratic nature of rulemaking and its
embrace of civic republican ideas of public participation); see also Cary Coglianese, Citizen
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 945 (2006)
(discussing the history of commenting in rulemaking as a means of engaging citizens in
regulatory development).
20. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2011) (explaining rulemaking’s relationship with legitimacy).
21. Response by Student #1, on file with author.
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$

“What is unique about Administrative Law, as compared to other
subjects? I think it offers the most opportunity for public
involvement, with nearly complete freedom and little to no cost
to the public, via the notice and comment process. First, I think it
is fantastic that the public is free to comment without being
forced to hire an attorney or spend any money. Second, I
appreciate the fact that the public is being invited to comment on
rules and regulations, which strike me as the forms of law that
most directly affect us. Third, with the internet making it
possible for nearly everyone to post a comment for the world to
see, and no indication of filtering of those comments on the part
of the agencies, it’s an incredible opportunity to exercise our
freedom of speech and attempt to influence the outcome of the
rules and regulations that will directly affect us. . . . Finally, and
maybe most amazingly, the agencies must consider any
comments they receive . . . .”22

$

“I’m incredibly thankful we have these policies and procedures
for rulemaking because during the comment period interested
parties can comment positively or negatively upon the proposed
rule. Of course, I would hope revoking the Clean Air Act would
receive a fair amount of negative comments, thereby deterring its
revocation. Overall, I found this subject matter to be the most
interesting because even though President Trump is holding the
most powerful office in the world, there are checks and balances
as to what he can do.”23

It was really quite remarkable how drawn the students were to the
democratic quality of the commenting process. The survey serves as a
reminder to those of us in the administrative law world that this very
important method of agency accountability should not be taken for granted.
Those wishing to keep current on rulemakings can sign up to receive a
“daily contents” email with the contents of the Federal Register, which will
include, hot off the presses, all proposed rules, final rules, and notices from
agencies published each day.24 This information and past issues of the
Federal Register are also available on the Federal Register’s website,

22. Response by Student #2, on file with author.
23. Response by Student #3, on file with author.
24. Receive Federal Register Contents by E-Mail, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/email-signup.html.
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searchable by date and by agency.25 To submit comments on proposed
rules, to view comments submitted on pending proposed rules or on final
rules, or to otherwise explore the administrative record for many rules that
are or have been the subject of a notice and comment process, one can also
visit Regulations.gov, where such information is searchable by date,
agency, and docket number.26
III. It Takes a Rule to Change a Rule: Commenting
in a Time of Administrative Transition
Rules generated by notice and comment—a relatively rigorous process—
get the benefit of a certain amount of durability, enduring even after agency
leadership or presidents change unless undone by the same rigorous
process. Just as it takes a law to repeal a law in Congress, it takes a notice
and comment rule to rescind or alter a rule that has already been made final
and effective through the notice and comment process. “A proposed but
unfinished rule usually can be withdrawn for any reason, without an
opportunity for comment on the withdrawal;” however, a “completed
legislative rule typically can be rescinded only after notice and comment.”27
That means that rules promulgated under a previous administration remain
binding with the force and effect of law until changed in the appropriate
way as outlined by the APA. As one court summarized, an agency “is
obligated to apply [its] own regulation, unless and until it is rescinded after
[the agency] affords notice and an opportunity to comment.”28
The existence of these procedural constraints, however, is not coupled
with significant substantive constraints on new administrations changing
rules (at least not beyond those constraints imposed by political
considerations). As long as a new administration’s regulatory position is
allowable by underlying statutes, on many regulatory issues where
discretion is available, the new administration has considerable latitude
within which to adopt new policies. Recent Supreme Court precedent has
25. FEDERAL REGISTER, http://www.federalregister.gov (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
26. REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
27. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 959-60 (2008).
28. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (D.D.C. 1983); see also, e.g.,
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 204-06 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining
that an agency cannot suspend effective date of final rule without completing notice and
comment to alter it); Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99-105 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating
that indefinite suspension of final rule did not comply with APA requirements for altering a
regulation already in effect).
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made it clear that “[a]gencies are free to change their existing policies as
long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change” and so long as
the new policies are consistent with their statutory authority.29 There is
normally not a heightened standard of review in such instances, so long as
the agency is aware that it is making a change and provides policy reasons
for it (which can include that there is a new administration that simply has
different regulatory priorities or assumptions).30 The Court has counseled
that “[i]n such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the
mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for
disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by
the prior policy.”31 Yet these explanations can be based on different ways of
interpreting data, competing policy preferences, or different philosophical
or economic assumptions. The “reasoned explanation” standard does not
give judges an opportunity to actually judge which policy choice—the old
or the new—is better.
Nonetheless, the commenting power is particularly potent during
regulatory alterations brought on by a change in administrations. Only some
explanation is necessary for the change; but, as explained above, to change
a rule promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking, an
administration must undergo a new notice and comment rulemaking
process. Thus, even though an agency is empowered to change its position
on a regulation, it cannot do so without first responding to significant
comments received during the comment period associated with the
proposed rule to rescind or change the existing rule.
Commenting in times of transition can often be of heightened
importance, no matter if one supports the status quo or a change in rules.
Commenting is the means to expose the flaws in any change of agency
position and to question the rationale for such change, forcing an agency to
respond and explain its decision, including to defend its reasons for change.
Even when the agency faces a relatively low threshold for changing
discretionary direction, such commenting has the potential to force agencies
to issue responses.
Commenting makes these agencies defend their “reasoned explanation”
in ways that otherwise might be less robust, less transparent, or less
publicly accessible and capable of scrutiny. As seen in Part V, failure of an
29. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
30. Id. at 2125-26 (“When an agency changes its existing position, it ‘need not always
provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a
blank slate.’” (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
31. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515-16.
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agency to respond to comments, even when the agency is otherwise given
latitude to alter a rule, can lead to an invalidation of the new rule—not
because it is new, but because of the consistent obligation to respond to
comments. Furthermore, even outside the direct challenge to a rule’s
validity in court, comments that force responses can create an open public
record for electoral review. Those responses allow voters to judge the
administration’s positions and hold the administration accountable or
demand that Congress do the same. The duty to respond to comments
creates a higher standard of explanation simply because of the level of
dialogue that must occur. If there are no comments, the agency naturally
need not explain nearly as much as when it must generate responses to
criticisms.
Of course, the commenting process also serves as a way for those
supportive of an administration’s change in position to provide additional
expertise as well as cover to help bolster the agency’s case—both for
administrative law’s “on-the-record review” and for judicial review
purposes. An agency’s action is far less likely to be deemed arbitrary and
capricious if the record supporting its rulemaking is robust. Supportive
comments help in that regard. Supportive comments can also help the
agency with its public relations. Just like the suggestion box in your local
store is more likely to include complaints than compliments, however, so
too do administrative dockets often see an imbalance where those with
objections to a rule are more likely to take time to comment. Supporters of
any regulatory effort should take care to remember that agencies need to
develop a strong record favoring their preferred position.
Moreover, supporters should be concerned that, without their comments,
an agency could be swayed to abandon a proposed rule or adopt a different,
less favorable course of action. Supporters of a proposed rule can also
demand that an agency explain itself should an agency decide to move
away from the proposed course. Therefore, while supporters could find that
their comments have utility in helping shield an agency’s decision from
assault in the courts, their comments might also turn out to be a way to
criticize the agency’s decision if it changes course. Moreover, like
opponents to the proposed rule, the initial supporters can also use the record
generated by the agency’s responses in the development of the larger
narrative in public debates and electoral considerations.
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IV. See Something, Say Something: The Commenting Power
Despite its potential for potency in affecting agency thinking, many rules
receive almost no public input.32 Some of the most controversial rules can
generate substantial commenting,33 but even those voices are not as diverse
as they could be given that those who comment are often especially
interested in the rule’s outcome. The commenting power is meaningless if
you don’t take the time to write a comment. You cannot have influence
through commenting without actually commenting—just as you cannot win
the lottery if you don’t buy a ticket. Those who see something happening in
the regulatory space that they care about—whether in opposition or
support—should say something.
Comments can take many forms, from legal brief-like documents to long
reports, simple letters, short emails, and even postcards. There are
strategies, forms, and styles for comments that can increase their
effectiveness, and books and other resources exist to provide commenters
guidance on drafting and submitting. Individuals should consider consulting
these tools34 to develop effective commenting strategies, including tactics
for writing comments in a manner that will increase their likelihood of
being deemed significant enough to demand a response from the agency.
As Part III outlined, comments can be in opposition to or in support of
rules. The rationale for using comments to oppose is rather intuitive. If an
agency proposes taking a course of action and no one explains why it
should not take that action, the agency is likely to go forth undeterred.
Less intuitive might be why one would spend the time and effort writing
supportive comments. Part III discussed several of those reasons.
Comments can give agencies additional record material upon which to rely
when proceeding with a particular regulatory action, thereby helping to
32. Mendelson, supra note 20, at 1345 (explaining that some rulemakings can receive
astonishingly high numbers of comments (even in the hundreds of thousands when assisted
by electronic means and public campaigns working to generate comments (sometimes in
forms)) but acknowledging that “[a]t the same time, . . . many rulemakings garner few, if
any, comments”).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., ELIZABETH D. MULLIN, THE ART OF COMMENTING: HOW TO INFLUENCE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING WITH EFFECTIVE COMMENTS (2d ed. 2013); RICHARD
STOLL, EFFECTIVE APA ADVOCACY: ADVANCING AND PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT’S INTEREST
IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (2000); Richard G. Stoll, Effective Written Comments in
Informal Rulemaking, 32 ADMIN. L. & REG. NEWS 15 (2007); Making Your Voice Heard:
Step-by-Step Tips for Writing Effective Comments, ENVTL. L. INST. (May 2012),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-04/documents/making-your-voiceheard.pdf.
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insulate the agency action from invalidation upon judicial review.
Sometimes agency officials may lack resources, lack expertise, or simply be
so new to the job that they are unable to research or articulate defenses for
their positions as well as a commenter might. Commenters can sometimes
be welcome allies in assisting an agency seeking to avoid being tarred with
what might otherwise be an insufficient record. The opportunity to rely on
supporters’ comments can often be a critical aid for agencies.
Comments themselves can also have multipurpose utility. While one
might write a comment for submission to an agency, that same work
product might also be effectively repurposed and used in public relations
campaigns associated with the interests advanced by the comments, thus
affecting social and political change even beyond affecting agency
decision-making. On a variety of levels, there is strategic utility of
commenting to affect legal, political, and social change even beyond the
agency record.
V. Agency Accountability: Duty to Consider and Respond to Comments
Comments can force agencies to better explain their decisions or
abandon courses of action that cannot be justified.35 As discussed above, the
mere existence of the commenting process acts as a check on the pool of
acceptable courses of action and deters agencies from embarking on
rulemaking that cannot withstand the scrutiny and exposure generated by
the commenting process. Comments submitted also have the potential to
create a situation where an agency does not, or is unable to, adequately
respond to the concerns raised, leaving a rule vulnerable to invalidation.
This Part details the precedents enforcing the duty to respond to comments,
which, for rules subject to notice and comment requirements, generally hold
that an agency will be deemed to be acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner if it fails to respond to significant comments.36
Responding to comments is critical to the exchange of views Congress
envisioned as a check on agency power and is a means to create betterinformed agency decisions. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., the D.C.
Circuit stressed that “there must be an exchange of views, information, and
criticism between interested persons and the agency” to make agency
35. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 157 (“Its obligation to solicit and receive comments is
‘inextricably intertwined’ with its statutory obligation to issue an explanatory statement with
each rule.”).
36. Id. (“[A]n agency need not respond to insignificant arguments. But if an agency
does not respond to significant comments, its decision-making cannot be deemed rational.”).
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rulemaking legitimate.37 The court continued, emphasizing that “a dialogue
is a two-way street: the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the
agency responds to significant points raised by the public.”38 Looking at the
whole picture is important, and commenters often help agencies complete
that task.
Consequently, the courts hold agencies accountable when they fail to
take comments seriously by not fulfilling their statutory duty under the
APA to consider and respond to comments submitted during rulemaking. 39
This requirement to consider and respond to comments is designed to
ensure that public participation is protected as meaningful, to guarantee that
the agency is thinking through its substantive choices, and to facilitate
assessment of an agency’s decision-making process during judicial review,
where a court must “assure itself that all relevant factors have been
considered by the agency.”40
When courts review agency rulemaking to determine whether the agency
has made a “reasoned decision,” analyzing an agency’s response to
comments is critical part of that exercise.41 Thus, the D.C. Circuit has
explained that an “agency’s response to public comments . . . ‘enable[s] [a
court] to see what major issues of policy were ventilated . . . and why the
agency reacted to them as it did.’”42 The commenting process and the duty
37. 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted) (citing Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Weinberg similarly calls the right to comment and the
agencies’ obligation to respond as “a two-way dialogic commitment, in which government
decision-makers may not simply ignore the arguments raised by citizens.” Weinberg, supra
note 4, at 150 (explaining that the APA requirements to allow comments and require
response is one way our law recognizes a citizen’s “right to be taken seriously”).
39. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 153 (stating that “[t]he institution of notice-and-comment
does a notable job of simulating a dialogic, discursive relationship in which government
must show the citizenry the respect of explaining itself—of hearing public comments and
responding to them directly,” but arguing it does not create enough of a connection).
40. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 36 (“A response is also mandated by Overton
Park[.]” (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971),
abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
41. Am. Mining Con. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Deference to
the agency does not, however, require us to abdicate the judicial duty carefully to ‘review
the record to ascertain that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on “reasonable
extrapolations from some reliable evidence”’ . . . .” (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated in part 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
42. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Auto. Parts
& Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1968)); see also Home Box
Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 36.
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to respond impose discipline on agencies, ensuring that they do not miss
analyzing important issues.43
Commenters should be aware that the duty to respond is only triggered
by serious and significant comments. Agencies “need not address every
comment, but [they] must respond in a reasoned manner to those that raise
significant problems.”44 Again, the guidance from the D.C. Circuit’s Home
Box Office opinion is helpful in determining what comments are and are not
“significant”:
In determining what points are significant, the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review must be kept in mind. Thus only
comments which, if true, raise points relevant to the agency’s
decision and which, if adopted, would require a change in an
agency’s proposed rule cast doubt on the reasonableness of a
position taken by the agency. Moreover, comments which
themselves are purely speculative and do not disclose the factual
or policy basis on which they rest require no response. There
must be some basis for thinking a position taken in opposition to
the agency is true.45
While the agency can avoid responding to insignificant comments, an
agency should be very cautious about deeming comments unworthy of
response. The response obligation is one that an agency must take seriously,
and the agency certainly cannot start out from a position of
dismissiveness.46
An agency’s response must also be coherent and substantive—a
conclusory brush-off to a comment will not be enough to satisfy the duty to
43. Loan Syndications v. SEC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 37, 63 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Indeed, failure
to address issues raised in comments may require a finding that the agencies acted in
violation of the APA by ‘fail[ing] “to consider an important aspect of the problem.”’” (citing
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
44. Id. at 64 (quoting Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
45. 567 F.2d at 35 n. 58 (citing Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 586 F.2d 375,
393-94 (1973)); see also Am. Mining Cong., 907 F.2d at 1187-88 (applying the Home Box
Office standard and reiterating that “in assessing the reasoned quality of the agency’s
decisions, we are mindful that the notice-and-comment provision of the APA . . . ‘has never
been interpreted to require [an] agency to respond to every comment, or to analyse [sic]
every issue or alternative raised by comments, no matter how insubstantial.’” (quoting
Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (brackets and “sic” in original)).
46. See generally N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755 (4th Cir.
2012).
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respond.47 In other words, the agency needs to “respond with sufficient
clarity or specificity to . . . significant challenges.”48 When an agency fails
to respond to specific challenges to the proposed rule’s authority, wisdom,
or support, its silence is arbitrary and capricious, and thus fatal to the rule.49
For example, the Fourth Circuit once analyzed an agency’s short comment
period and express statement in advance that the agency would not consider
(let alone respond to) some comments that were clearly relevant. The court
determined that such an attitude made the agency noncompliant with notice
and comment requirements.50
In a 2016 case decided by the D.C. Circuit, the US Department of the
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) did not
respond to comments by interested stakeholders, as it was required to do.
Nonresponsiveness led to the invalidation of some rules51 because the
ignored comments were meaningful, that is, “significant enough.” In other
words, the comments “raise[d] points relevant to the agency’s decision
and . . . if adopted, would require a change in an agency’s proposed rule.”52
Regarding other sections in the same rulemaking, the court determined that
the failure to respond to comments was not significant because, “even
accepting” the comments as an accurate critique, “there is no indication
that” the matters addressed in the comments “played a meaningful role in
47. Am. Mining Cong., 907 F.2d at 1189 (finding agency’s in-the-record responses to
serious challenges to data used were insufficient because the court found “only conclusory
statements that do not respond to the petitioner’s challenges in any coherent manner”).
48. Id. at 1190-91 (“We are constrained to remand to the agency for a fuller
explanation . . . . Neither the summary comments nor the 1980 reports respond with
sufficient clarity or specificity to the petitioners’ admittedly significant challenges.”).
49. Id. at 1191 (“[T]he agency’s failure to respond to petitioners’ specific challenges in
the record is fatal here, since ‘the points raised in the comments were sufficiently central that
agency silence . . . demonstrate[s] the rulemaking to be arbitrary and capricious.’” (quoting
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F. 2d 156, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
50. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 769-70.
51. FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 209 F. Supp.3d 299, 334-35 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]he Court
concludes that FBME’s comments regarding FinCEN’s analysis of SARs data were
‘significant,’ since resolving them in the Bank’s favor would likely have ‘require[d] a
change in [FinCEN’s] proposed rule.’” (alteration in original) (quoting City of Portland v.
EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2007))
52. Id. at 333 (determining it was “clear that FinCEN did not meaningfully respond to
FBME’s comments regarding the agency’s analysis of SARs data,” then explaining the test
by which the court “must evaluate whether those comments were sufficiently “significant” to
warrant a response.” (citing and quoting City of Portland, 507 F.3d at 714-16 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Reytblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Home
Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 35 n.58)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

616

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:601

the rulemaking such that [the commenters’] critique, if true, would have
changed the outcome of the Second Final Rule.”53 Thus, commenters’
“concerns . . . that FinCEN did not explicitly address are sufficiently
insignificant that FinCEN was not required to address them in more
detail.”54
Consider also the 2015 D.C. Circuit opinion in Delaware Department of
Natural Resources & Environmental Control v. EPA.55 The court noted that
“[d]uring the notice and comment period, petitioners presented their
concerns about the 2013 [emissions standards for air pollutants] Rule’s
impact on the efficiency and reliability of the energy grid.”56 The court
agreed with petitioners that the “EPA should have, but did not, respond
properly to their well-founded concerns.”57 The court characterized the
agency as offering only “wan responses” to the comments.58 The cursory
treatment failed to demonstrate that the agency had thought through what
the commenters were actually suggesting. When commenters explained big
ideas, the EPA seemed not to understand them and “missed the forest for
the trees” when “the overriding concern of these comments was the
perverse effect the 100–hour exemption would have on the reliability and
efficiency of the capacity and energy markets, not the specific clean energy
alternatives that could supply the grid instead of backup generators.” 59
Finding that the EPA utterly missed the big-picture effects described in the
comments, the court determined that the EPA did not comply with its duty
to respond under the APA when it “essentially said that it was not its job to
worry about those concerns.”60 The court concluded that the “EPA cannot

53. Id. at 336-37; see also Loan Syndications v. SEC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 37, 64 (D.D.C.
2016) (demonstrating that failure to respond to a comment is not a strict liability offense;
holding agency action valid “[e]ven though the agencies did not necessarily address each
and every concern raised by these comments,” because such failure did not demonstrate that
agency’s decision “‘was not based on a consideration of the relevant factors.’” (quoting
Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
54. FBME Bank, 209 F. Supp. at 336.
55. 785 F.3d 1, 13-24 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
56. Id. at 13-14.
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15 (“[The EPA] refused to engage with the commenters’ dynamic markets
argument. At points, its later statements contradicted earlier responses.”).
60. Id. at 15.
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get away so easily from its obligations under the APA to respond to
‘relevant and significant’ comments.”61
Further, when commenters suggested that the EPA consult with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the EPA improperly
passed the buck when it stated those “are comments more appropriately
directed towards the FERC.”62 Ultimately the court held that the “EPA
cannot have it both ways” by “simultaneously rely[ing] on reliability
concerns and then brush[ing] off comments about those concerns as beyond
its purview.” Consequently, the “EPA’s response [or lack thereof] to
comments suggests that its 100–hour rule, to the extent that it impacts
system reliability, is not ‘the product of agency expertise.’”63 Furthermore,
the rule prohibiting post hoc rationalizations in administrative law means
that an agency must consider and respond to comments before
promulgating its final rule, not in some later-in-time justification.64 The
court thus concluded that, although “[d]uring oral argument, EPA’s
attorney told the court that EPA ‘heard’ the commenters’ concerns about
the 2013 Rule . . . merely hearing is not good enough[.] EPA must respond
to serious objections” and must do so in the final rule.65 Because it had
failed to do so, the EPA’s “rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious” in that
case.66
Long-standing precedent supports the agency duty to respond because it
is essential to making the commenting power meaningful. Part VI provides
some recent examples that show the endurance of these critical standards
today.

61. Id. (quoting Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 223 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
62. Id. at 18 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 6685 (2013)).
63. Id. at 18 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Ass’n,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
64. For a discussion of the prohibition on post hoc rationalizations and its justification
in administrative law, see Donald J. Kochan, Constituencies and Contemporaneousness in
Reason-Giving: Thoughts and Direction After T-Mobile, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22, 27, 3639 (2015).
65. Del. Dept. of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control, 785 F.3d at 16.
66. Id.
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VI. Recent Cases Illustrating the Commenting Power and
Consequences for Agency Failure to Respond
In addition to longstanding precedent on the duty to respond, two very
recent cases are instructive on the potential potency of the commenting
power.
In Sierra Club v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit denied an EPA motion to dismiss
a complaint challenging a final rule regarding “maximum achievable
control technology” (MACT) standards for emissions of certain hazardous
air pollutants (HAPs).67 The court held that the “EPA did not adequately
respond to petitioners’ comments,” and remanded to the EPA for further
proceedings.68 In attempting to meet statutory demands for listing certain
HAPs and emissions targets, the EPA relied on “surrogates.” Specifically,
“rather than issuing new specific standards, the agency relied on previously
set emission limits for another hazardous air pollutant or compound, ‘which
serves as a surrogate for the targeted section [7412](c)(6) [pollutant].’”69
Commenters, including the petitioners in the case, challenged that
practice of using surrogates, contending instead that HAP-specific
standards should be set or that, if a surrogate is to be used, then the “EPA
must demonstrate the reasonableness of the use of a particular surrogate in a
specific context.”70 The EPA provided some explanation for some
surrogacy choices, but according to the court, “failed to respond adequately
to comments disputing those explanations.”71
The court identified two primary errors. First, the EPA claimed that the
challenges were untimely, so it was not required to respond in the
comments.72 But the court rejected the timeliness argument; consequently,
“the substantive comments raised meritorious issues unanswered by EPA”
requiring remand.73 Second, the court held the EPA could not claim that,
because the surrogacy standards were old and tested when previously
applied to other determinations, the proposed rule raised no new substantive
issues regarding those standards.74 The court explained that the “EPA
cannot hide behind the established nature of the standards it uses when it

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

863 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836 (quoting 79 C.F.R. 74,677 (2014)).
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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applies new surrogacy relationships.”75 In its conclusion, the court
determined that “[p]roviding brand-new clarification of some surrogacy
relationships necessarily rendered it substantive and EPA’s failure to
explain sufficiently these newly ‘clarified’ relationships and respond to the
associated comments dooms the current determination.”76
Meaningful public participation is protected when the courts review an
agency’s compliance with its duty to take comments seriously. Sierra Club
is just one of the latest poignant reminders that agencies cannot take lightly
their responsibility to engage with commenters and that there are
consequences for failing to fulfill an agency’s duty to respond.
The opinion in Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA,77 also from the D.C.
Circuit, is another wonderful example of the power of commenting and an
example of the judiciary’s willingness to scrutinize the sufficiency of an
agency’s consideration of comments. The case involved a 2008 final rule by
the EPA regarding reporting requirements for air releases from animal
waste at farms,78 and the public’s interest in accessing the information that
could be gathered from reviewing such reports.
According to the court, “the EPA has broad powers to take remedial
actions or order further monitoring or investigation” upon being notified by
farms and other entities about the release of certain hazardous materials—
like the ammonia or hydrogen sulfide released from animal waste—under
reporting requirements in sections of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)79 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA).80 Although both statutes require reporting of the release of
hazardous substances above a certain threshold, the EPA’s 2008 final rule
exempted farms “from CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements for
air releases from animal waste”81 above that threshold, contending that such
“reports are unnecessary because, in most cases, a federal response is
impractical and unlikely.”82 In fact, the EPA claimed that “it had never
taken response action based on notifications of air releases from animal
75. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
78. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of
Hazardous Substances From Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,956/1 (Dec.
18, 2008).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603-9604 (2012).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (2012).
81. Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 530.
82. Id.
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waste” and it could not “foresee a situation where [it] would take any future
response action as a result of such notification[s].”83
In other words, the EPA based its exemption on the justification that it
did not see any utility for the agency to receive such reporting information
on releases, so there was no need to demand it. The EPA was seemingly
invoking the de minimis exception—a judicially created doctrine (and a
cousin of the avoiding absurdity doctrine) that excuses strict compliance
with a statute’s terms and grants an agency “authority to create even certain
categorical exceptions to a statute ‘when the burdens of regulation yield a
gain of trivial or no value,’”84 because “[a]gencies are not . . . ‘helpless
slaves to literalism.’”85 To support its exemption decisions, the EPA
pointed only to provisions in the statute that the court held did not “even
hint[] at the type of reporting exemption the EPA adopted in the Final
Rule,” yet “the EPA extract[ed] from them a notion that Congress meant to
‘avoid[ ] duplication of effort . . . and minimiz[e] the burden on both
regulated entities and government response agencies.’”86 The court held
that the EPA’s exemptions could not be justified under the de minimis
exception because the EPA erred when it “purported to find an absence of
regulatory benefit,”87 and because “[efficiency] concerns don’t give the
agency carte blanche to ignore the statute whenever it decides the reporting
requirements aren’t worth the trouble.”88
Commenters objected to the EPA’s exemption rule on many grounds,
which brings us to lesson one of the case: it demonstrates a victory for
commenters and proof that commenting can sometimes change an agency’s
position between a proposed rule and a final rule. In light of comments
received, the EPA changed its position in the final rule and retained
reporting requirements regarding releases from large concentrated animal
feeding operations (CAFOs), in part because EPCRA has an express public
disclosure requirement in the statute (unlike CERCLA, which does not
directly deal with public disclosure for information regarding releases). 89

83. Id. at 531-32.
84. Id. at 530 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
85. Id. at 535 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 535 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014)
(“[A]n agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute
should operate.”)).
89. Id. at 532 (“[P]ublic comments seeking information about emissions from the
largest farms (so-called CAFOs), led the EPA to carve CAFOs out of its EPCRA
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That result in the rulemaking record illustrates that sometimes comments
result in real changes in agency policy even after the agency thought it
might act in certain way prior to considering the comments.
Lesson two from the case concerns evidence of accountability when
agencies fail to respond adequately to comments received. In choosing to
retain the other exemptions, the EPA claimed there would be no value to
obtaining the information supplied by reporting, as discussed above. The
commenters disagreed, asserting both that the EPA had many options
available in its tool belt to take responsive action or to order remedial action
and that the reporting information had independent value even if the EPA
did not see an immediate, direct way that the agency would use the
information—other constituencies of the information would find it valuable
and could use it for productive purposes. The court agreed that the record
showed the EPA had remedial powers that could address reported
releases.90 Thus, as the court explained, the commenters “put before the
EPA a good deal of information, not refuted by the EPA, suggesting
scenarios where the reports could be quite helpful in fulfilling the statutes’
goals.”91 The commenters described in detail ways that the EPA could
respond to releases using its existing authority, so the court found EPA
deficient in its duty to respond to comments when the agency simply
claimed, “it is unclear what response the commenter had in mind.”92
Furthermore, the court agreed that there was an informational benefit to the
public and others from release information, including local officials who
could use the information to formulate effective and safe responses that
“emergency commissions could use . . . when responding to citizen
complaints or genuine emergencies.”93 The EPA made some statements
why it felt the reports would not be useful to the agency, but failed to see
that the reports might have broader utility beyond those limited agency
purposes.

exemption. . . . The Final Rule thus requires CAFOs to continue reporting air emissions
under EPCRA, but not under CERCLA; other farms are exempt from both.”).
90. Id. at 530 (“In light of the record, we find that those reports aren’t nearly as useless
as the EPA makes them out to be. . . . We therefore grant Waterkeeper’s petition and vacate
the Final Rule.”).
91. Id. at 537 (“Whatever the EPA’s past experience in responding to mandated
information may have been, it plainly has broad authority to respond. CERCLA authorizes
both removal and remedial actions.”).
92. Id. at 536.
93. Id. at 536-37.
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While granting Waterkeeper Alliance’s petition and vacating the final
rule, the court summarized the disconnect between the comments submitted
and the path chosen by the EPA as follows:
[T]he comments undermine the EPA’s primary justification for
the Final Rule—namely, that notifications of animal-wasterelated releases serve no regulatory purpose because it would be
“impractical or unlikely” to respond to such a release. It’s not at
all clear why it would be impractical for the EPA to investigate
or issue abatement orders (as suggested by the Clean Air
Agencies) in cases where pumping techniques or other actions
lead to toxic levels of hazardous substances such as hydrogen
sulfide. And the SARA Title III Officials provide at least one
way that local or state authorities might use the CERCLA release
reports—to narrow an investigation when they get a phone call
reporting a suspicious smell or similarly vague news of possibly
hazardous leaks. The record therefore suggests the potentiality of
some real benefits.94
When commenters raise significant concerns, the APA requires the agency
to prove it has considered them, in part by respecting the commenters by
providing a response. When an agency fails to do so, its actions cannot
withstand judicial review. That is the commenting power.
VII. Conclusion
The commenting power allows ordinary citizens and organized interests
alike to have a real, influential role in notice and comment rulemaking and
the formulation of regulatory policy. Real people are empowered by the
commenting process to have a real say in how the administrative state
impacts their real lives. Oftentimes comments don’t change an agency’s
course when a proposed rule is opposed or don’t prove consequential in
convincing the agency to stay the course when a proposed rule is supported.
But sometimes, comments do. Furthermore, you can’t play a role in
possibly influencing an agency position unless you enter the game.
Thankfully, for the purposes of accountability and the supply of
information into the regulatory process, the Administrative Procedure Act
gives everyone that meaningful opportunity to participate.

94. Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
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